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LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF UTILIZATION
REVIEW AS A COST CONTAINMENT
MECHANISM
Health care costs have escalated dramatically over the last several decades
with a three-fold increase in per capita costs since 1950.1 The Congressional
Budget Office estimates health care expenditures will increase from $190 bil-
lion in 1991 to $300 billion in 1995, supplanting defense as the largest com-
ponent of the federal budget.2 The increased cost of health care has had a
wide and potentially devastating economic impact: seventeen percent of the
American population has no health insurance coverage; 3 the federal Medi-
care program faces bankruptcy before the year 2000;' state Medicaid pro-
grams are in financial distress;' and American business, underwriter of one-
third of the nation's health care costs through employee benefit programs,
faces tougher international competition because of the rapidly expanding
health care component of labor costs.6
Rising health care costs have been attributed to numerous factors, includ-
ing overall price inflation, expensive technological advances, the rapid
growth of hospital facilities, the increased needs of an older and more
acutely ill population, and the practice of "defensive" medicine (spurred by
an increase in malpractice liability).7 Significantly, third party payers' have
1. E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1719, 1720 (1987).
2. James Flanigan, US. Health-Care System Getting a Dose of Reality, L.A. TiMEs, Sept.
29, 1991, at DI (noting that health care expenditures are expected to rise from 13.5% of the
federal budget in 1991 to 20% in 1995); see also Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression, and
Shear: Directions, Stresses, and Outcomes of Health Care Cost Control, 15 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 101, 109 (1990) (noting that health care per capita costs rose from 5.2% of the
United States gross national product in 1960 to 11.2% in 1987).
3. Flanigan, supra note 2.
4. Morreim, supra note 1, at 1720.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1720-21.
7. Id. at 1720; Leslie C. Giordani, Comment, A Cost Containment Malpractice Defense:
Implications for the Standard of Care and for Indigent Patients, 26 Hous. L. REV. 1007, 1009
(1989).
8. The term "third party payers" refers to the entities which pay for health care services
rendered to members (beneficiaries) of a health care plan or policy. Third party payers include
insurance companies, charities, publicly financed programs such as Medicare and Medicaid,
and employers who provide health insurance to their employees on a self-insured basis-ie.,
where the employer acts as an insurer by paying the medical expenses of its covered employees
instead of purchasing an insurance plan to pay the expenses. Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health
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encouraged maximum use of high-priced technologies and facilities by the
nature of their reimbursement system-paying in retrospect for each service
as rendered-thereby raising the revenues of health care providers as the
prescribed use of services increased.9 As one commentator has stated,
"Thus insulated from the economic costs of their decisions and inspired by
the societal value that each patient should receive the best health care avail-
able, physicians and other providers have had powerful incentives to deliver
all indicated care, and virtually no incentives to hold back."'" The creation
of commercial enterprises to manage and administer the delivery of health
care has further contributed to the escalation of health care costs; in fact,
many of these enterprises profit from a continued escalation of costs which
enhances the need for their services."
By the early 1980s, the fiscal impossibility of continuing to underwrite
expanding health care costs in a system with few valid restraints mandated
some form of cost control. The government and third party payers re-
sponded with new methods of financing health care designed to control the
use of hospital facilities and expensive technologies-primarily by initiating
prospective payment plans that cap reimbursement fees or require prior au-
thorization for elective procedures and by guarantying reimbursement only
as approved. 12 In addition, new systems for the delivery of health care fo-
cusing on utilization control rapidly proliferated-the most common exam-
ple of which is the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). 3
Utilization review (UR) is a cost containment and quality assurance strat-
egy implemented to enforce the above cost control efforts.' 4 It is the process
by which health care services are examined to ensure that the services pro-
vided are both necessary and cost-efficient.' 5 Insurance coverage is denied if
these criteria are not satisfied and, due to prohibitive costs, individuals are
Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109,
1111 (1990); see also Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost Containment and Medical
Malpractice: On a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 91, 91-96 (1986) (identifying
employers as the principal health care payers); Evans, supra note 2, at 102-03 (describing con-
flicting interests between health care payers and providers). The providers of health care are
the actual caregivers-e.g., hospitals, clinics, physicians, nurses, and suppliers. Id. at 103.
9. Morreim, supra note 1, at 1720.
10. Id.
11. Evans, supra note 2, at 115. For example, competitive efforts to obtain the most cost-
effective health care plans and meet administrative requirements have, under various govern-
ment plans, increased the use of management consultants, accountants, and public relations
specialists. Id.
12. See Morreim, supra note 1, at 1721.
13. Id.
14. Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current
Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 421, 436 (1989).
15. Id.
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not likely to seek care at their own expense.16 Thus, because an improper
UR denial may prevent the delivery of appropriate care and result in patient
injury, UR may create liability in the attempt to constrain costs.17
Although survival of the current health care system depends on the suc-
cess of cost control strategies,"3 medical malpractice cases increasingly re-
flect tension between the quality and economics of care.1 9 Despite limited
experience adjudicating liability for UR and other cost containment pro-
grams, courts have recently held third party payers and others involved in
the UR process potentially liable in cases in which a negligent UR decision
leads to patient injury.2' Although stringent standards may deter negligence
in the application of UR, overly stringent standards are likely to frustrate
legitimate cost control efforts. Since medical malpractice is determined ac-
cording to standards of the medical community,2" standards that conform to
reasonable financial considerations should be encouraged by the health care
community, lawmakers, and courts. Such standards support valid cost con-
trol efforts, including UR, and simultaneously protect patients against arbi-
trary or negligent medical decisions.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the nature of health care cost
control strategies. Next, it presents an overview of cost containment pro-
grams undertaken by the government, employers and insurers, hospitals, and
other health care providers. This overview illustrates the relevance of utili-
zation management in cost containment and provides a synopsis of some of
the cost control measures at issue in medical litigation. A discussion of UR
as a mechanism for cost containment follows, with particular emphasis on
how it applies to the Medicare/Medicaid diagnosis related group (DRG)
system of reimbursement and the HMO-type provider organization. Finally,
this Comment addresses the liability implications of the UR process by ana-
lyzing current case law and the ramifications of a cost control defense. The
focus of this Comment is on prospective review of health care costs. Since
16. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment: Challenging Fidelity and Justice, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1988, at 20, 23; cf Kalb, supra note 8, at 1115-16 (addressing the
relationship between insurance coverage and utilization).
17. Paul Marcotte, Cost vs. Quality: Health-Care Payors Face New Liability Risk, A.B.A.
J., June 1, 1988, at 26.
18. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 1, at 1719-24; William B. Schwartz, We're Already
Rationing Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1989, at A21.
19. Marcotte, supra note 17 (quoting Barry Furrow, Address at the A.B.A. Medical Mal-
practice National Institute, Reno, Nev. (Mar. 1988)).
20. E.g., Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, reprinted at 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct.
App. 1986), review dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987); Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr.
876 (Ct. App. 1990) review denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 4574 (Oct. 11, 1990); Bush v. Dake, No.
86-25767 NM-2 (Cir. Ct. for Saginaw County, Mich. Apr. 27, 1989).
21. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 440-42.
1992]
382 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:379
this form of UR is more effective at containing costs than is retrospective
review, it is more likely to impact the quality of patient care and lead to
potential liability.
I. THE NATURE OF COST CONTROL STRATEGIES
Cost control can operate from two perspectives: externally, by a reduc-
tion in the amount of care consumed; or internally, by a reduction in the cost
of items or services provided.22 In other words, cost is decreased by either
using fewer health care services or by making health care less expensive.2 3
Utilization management or control, the efficient use of available health care
resources, is the basis for cost control efforts from both perspectives; UR is
the primary mechanism involved. Basically, UR is a process under which
the use of health care services for a specific patient is compared to an estab-
lished norm for the use of similar services for comparable patients.24 Insur-
ers set reimbursement limits accordingly by denying payments for
22. See George A. Gregory, Who Should Receive Intensive Care?, 11 CRITICAL CARE
MED. 767, 768 (1983). External controls generally reduce the consumption of services by an
explicit denial of care or the withholding of reimbursement. Internal controls reduce costs
while providing the same overall services, although the level of quality may be reduced. See
Schwartz, supra note 18. For example, in order to obtain an internal cost reduction, an em-
ployer may contract with a less expensive insurance carrier for the administration of its insur-
ance program, yet provide the same general health services to employees. Similarly, a provider
(i.e., hospital, HMO, physician) may obtain less expensive supplies or employ fewer or less
expensive personnel to provide the same general patient services. See id. (describing analogous
cost reductions as "silent rationing"). Whether the provider retains the savings or passes them
on to the consumer (the patient/payer), the effect is still that of reducing the overall costs of
health care. See also Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers
to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 436-37 (1988) (discussing the
internalization of health care costs in the HMO-type provider). Note, however, that the dis-
tinction between internal and external forces on health care economics exists from other per-
spectives. For example, external forces may refer to forces entirely outside the health care
system. See generally Evans, supra note 2, at 104-06 (describing the true expansionary forces
in health care costs as internal to the health care system rather than external to the system).
23. See Gregory, supra note 22, at 768; Schwartz, supra note 18 (discussing cost reduc-
tions in terms of explicit rationing and implicit or "silent" rationing of services). The division
of cost containment methods has also been described in terms of three, rather than two cate-
gories of health care rationing which affect access to medical services: market rationing, influ-
enced by the consumer's ability to pay directly or through insurance coverage; explicit
rationing, influenced by the decisions of health care administrators as to who and what will be
covered under various health care plans; and implicit rationing, influenced by health care prov-
iders who are encouraged to conservatively use available medical resources. Sara T. Fry, Ra-
tioning Health Care: The Ethics of Cost Containment, 1 NURSING ECON. 165, 165-67 (1983).
Although both providers and payers may seek more health care activity, the providers would
like to charge a higher cost for health care services, while the payers would like to pay a lower
cost for services. Evans, supra note 2, at 124.
24. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 436.
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questionable services or capping fee payments at specified levels or both."
Providers such as hospitals26 and HMOs27 use similar comparisons to lessen
the expense of care they provide by reducing the amount of care delivered to
no more than the established norm.28
UR is now an integral part of the government health care reimbursement
system through Medicare and Medicaid and is increasingly being imple-
mented by private third party payers, purchasers, and various health care
organizers to control costs.29 Originally, UR was the process under which
the payer/insurer reviewed medical charges incurred by a covered patient
and denied reimbursement for charges deemed unreasonable or unneces-
sary.3° As health care costs have escalated, UR has evolved into a broader
and more pervasive process. Thus, the term utilization "review" has become
somewhat of a misnomer. As currently used, UR encompasses not just an
examination of services already provided (retrospective review), but also in-
cludes the streamlining of prospective services to provide coverage for only
the most cost-efficient and necessary care (prospective review). 3 Since UR
may limit or ration the amount of health care provided, especially through
prospective denials of coverage, it has an inherent potential to create liability
when patient injury results.32
II. COST CONTAINMENT PROGRAMS
UR is not the sole mechanism in the effort to control health care costs.
From a broader perspective, utilization management and control concepts
25. See Morreim, supra note 1, at 1721.
26. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 438 (discussing the ISD Review System developed
by J. Lamprey at InterQual which measures the medical necessity, appropriateness, and qual-
ity of hospital treatment).
27. See Jacqueline M. Saue, Legal Issues Related to Case Management, QRB, Aug. 1988,
at 239, 239.
28. As implemented by providers, UR involves an overlap in the internal-external cost
control distinction. Decreasing the cost of care is an internal reduction to the provider, but
may be achieved through an external reduction in the amount of care provided. For example,
reducing the number of diagnostic tests ordered by physicians is both an internal savings to a
hospital and an external reduction in the amount of care consumed. Similarly, conservative
medical treatment-as opposed to more expensive surgical treatment-is a reduction in the
cost of service provided by an HMO, as well as a reduction in the amount of care consumed.
See Hall, supra note 22, at 436-37.
29. John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and
Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REv. 191, 192-97 (1989).
30. Dorsett Marc Lyde, Case Comment, Wickline v. State: The Emerging Liability of
Third Party Health Care Payors, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1987).
31. For a discussion of the prospective and retrospective nature of the UR process, see
infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
32. See Marcotte, supra note 17.
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pervade the realm of cost containment measures. Significant efforts to hold
down costs through utilization control have been undertaken by: 1) the fed-
eral and state governments, which pay approximately forty percent of all
health care expenditures; aa 2) businesses, which ultimately pay the majority
of reimbursed employee health care expenditures for covered employees,
either through self-insured programs or insurance premiums; 34 3) insurance
companies; 35 and 4) the health care industry itself, through hospital pro-
grams 6 and the development of alternative delivery systems which provide
complete health care services for set enrollment fees. 37 An overview of cost
containment programs demonstrates an emphasis on controlling utilization
to contain costs.
A. Legislative Programs38
The most comprehensive governmental program instituted to control es-
calating health care costs is the DRG method of reimbursement used under
Medicare and some state Medicaid programs.3 9 DRGs, enacted by Con-
33. Kalb, supra note 8, at 1111.
34. Id. at 1111 n. 10 (noting that employers pay approximately 75% of all private health
insurance premiums). For a discussion of employer responsibility for costs, see infra notes 78-
79 and accompanying text.
35. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 437.
36. See id. at 438.
37. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1012-13.
38. This Comment does not address regulatory efforts to control health care costs that are
not related to the UR process, such as the power of some state commissions to set hospital
rates. See, e.g., Blue Cross v. Franklin Square Hosp., 352 A.2d 798 (Md. 1976) (discussing the
power of the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission, now codified at MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-201 to 19-222 (1990 & Supp. 1991), to review and set
hospital rates), appealed after remand Health Serv. Cost Review Comm'n v. Franklin Square
Hosp., 372 A.2d 1051 (Md. 1977); Health Serv. Cost Review Comm'n v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
431 A.2d 641 (Md. 1981) (holding the power of the Maryland state commission to regulate
total hospital costs did not include the authority to approve and set the professional
component of hospital-based physicians' fees).
In addition, a number of state legislatures have made significant efforts to reduce medical
costs by statutorily capping malpractice awards. In some states these caps have been upheld
by the courts, but in others they have been declared unconstitutional. Judy Tyrrell, Case
Comment, Interpretation of Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act: Boyd v. Bulala, 12 GEo.
MASON U. L. REV. 361, 361 (1990). Malpractice caps, along with other tort reforms, are an
attempt to cut down the utilization of health care resources which go toward the payment of
higher insurance premiums, litigation costs, and award payments. See Charles P. Bailey, An
Alternative Approach to the Malpractice Crisis, LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC., Dec. 1988, at 1,
10. Other tort reforms include reductions in the time permitted for filing tort claims,
reductions in attorney contingency fees, the use of screening panels to review cases prior to
trial, changes in the rules for joint and several liability, and provisions for structured awards.
Id.
39. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1010; see also Hall, supra note 22, at 436 n. 15 (noting that
eleven states employ DRG systems to determine Medicaid reimbursements, but pointing out
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gress as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, 4' limit reimburse-
ments to specified amounts according to diagnostic categories. 4 This type
of prospective fee payment system, in which hospitals receive a predeter-
mined fee for patient care, is dependent upon a patient's diagnosis but is
unrelated to the actual cost of care.4 2 Hospitals are prohibited from billing
the patient for excess cost and must absorb the cost of overruns.4 a
Other regulatory efforts limit or define the services that providers may
offer. 44 For example, regulations may limit the number of hospital beds
available or the acquisition of certain high-technology equipment to that
which is based on substantiated community need.45 Providers are thereby
discouraged from prescribing unnecessary care in order to recoup expenses
that many states have opted instead to structure their Medicaid programs as HMOs). A
number of states have implemented even more rigorous "all payer" cost control systems which
apply DRGs or other forms of prospective reimbursement to all hospital patients. Id. at 436.
In addition, some private payers have adopted the DRG method of reimbursement at their
own initiative. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1010.
40. The DRG system of reimbursement under Medicare is now codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1395ww(d)(4) (West 1992).
41. JOSEPH AND ROSE KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, SCOPE NOTE No. 4, DIAGNOSIS
RELATED GROUPS (DRGs) AND THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: FORECASTING SO-
CIAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (1984). DRGs categorize all illnesses within approximately 400 listings.
Id.
42. Morreim, supra note 1, at 1010. DRG systems are aimed at institutions. Reimburse-
ment for individual physicians has not been subject to DRG limitations. See Hall, supra note
22, at 434 (noting no direct limits on physician reimbursement in spite of estimates which
place 70 to 90% of health care expenditures under the control of individual physicians). But
see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 (West 1992) (codifying broad Congressional changes to the Medi-
care physicians' reimbursement system under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2169 (1989), amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990), in which a resource-based
relative value scale was scheduled to be implemented for the reimbursement of physicians' fees
effective January 1, 1992).
43. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1010 n.22. This creates incentives to cut costs by under-
treating patients. Id. at 1011. Accordingly, critics allege that the DRG system of reimburse-
ment reduces access to needed care and lowers the quality of care provided, particularly to the
elderly and indigent recipients of Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Id. at 1010-11.
44. See Michael G. Vita et al., Economic Analysis in Health Care Antitrust, 7 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 73, 93 (1991).
45. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1014; Vita et al., supra note 44, at 93. Numerous states
require health planning agency approval of proposed hospital capital expansions in the form of
certificates of need (CONS), which are dependent upon a showing that the proposed expan-
sions will satisfy a community need. Id. Similar approval for capital expenditures was re-
quired by the federal government until 1987. Id. at 93 n.59 (citing § 221 of the Social Security
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 1386 (42 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1395, 1396,
as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 1386 (adding § 1122 to Title XI of the Social
Security Act))).
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for beds or equipment that the community is unable to support. 6
B. Employer/Insurer Programs
There are a number of methods by which employers and insurers, as third
party payers, discourage the utilization of health care. First, they have insti-
tuted requirements that the insured bear a larger portion of health care
costs4 7 and have increased enforcement of both coordination of benefit pro-
visions and policy subrogation rights.4" Second, employers obtain the most
economical coverage plans by encouraging competition among health care
providers and insurers.4 9 Third, most insurance policies limit coverage to
nonexperimental care that is "reasonably" or "medically" necessary." In
addition, some benefit plans provide for voluntary or mandatory second sur-
gical opinions to reduce the incidence of unnecessary surgical procedures, 5 1
and many require preadmission review for coverage of hospital charges. 52
However, expensive and wasteful technologies-including those that are un-
safe, ineffective, or more expensive than existing alternative treatments-are
46. See Giordani, supra note 7, at 1014 (describing the placing of limit controls on provid-
ers as a form of cost containment).
47. This burden on the employee/insured takes the form of higher deductibles, copay-
ments, and coinsurance amounts. The number of employees receiving "first-dollar" medical
coverage declined substantially during the 1980s. Macaulay, supra note 8, at 96.
48. Id. at 97. Coordination of benefit provisions establish a priority system of payment if
multiple insurance carriers are involved to prevent the insured from receiving more than 100%
reimbursement. Subrogation rights allow the payer to be reimbursed where the employee/
insured recovers from a third party. Id.
49. Morreim, supra note 1, at 1721.
50. Kalb, supra note 8, at 1114-15. Thus, coverage may depend on what constitutes "ex-
perimental" therapy. For example, a federal district court recently declared that breast cancer
treatment with high dose chemotherapy and autologous bone marrow transplant was within
plan coverage, despite the insurer's prospective determination that the therapy was noncom-
pensable experimental therapy. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 594 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (noting, however, that this was a narrow decision based on the specific plan involved
and the expert medical testimony presented). The court pointed out that the insurer's determi-
nation would probably have survived an arbitrary and capricious standard of review; however,
because the terms of the plan did not give the utilization reviewer discretion to deny experi-
mental therapies, the decision was subject to the court's de novo review. Id. at 595 n.20. But
see Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991). In Adams, the court
held that an insurer's decision to deny coverage for autologous bone marrow transplant ther-
apy was arbitrary and capricious since the company had not deferred to the consensus opinion
of Maryland oncologists to determine the accepted standard of medical practice. Id. at 676.
The court noted that the contract had no language allowing the plan administrator to unilater-
ally review medical data and decide if a procedure fell within the accepted standard of practice.
Id. For a discussion of "medical necessity" language typical to health insurance contracts, see
Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267, 270-73 (Cal. 1987).
51. Macaulay, supra note 8, at 98.
52. Morreim, supra note 1, at 1721.
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often covered as a result of liberal judicial construction of policy terms.53
Because advanced medical technologies-including drugs, equipment, and
medical-surgical procedures-may account for up to fifty percent of health
care inflation, one commentator has proposed a plan whereby private insur-
ers offer a multi-tiered system of health insurance with a series of increas-




Attempts to control inpatient costs have intensified because hospitals are
required to absorb costs not covered under DRG forms of reimbursement.5 6
A stronger emphasis on UR is key to this effort and has led to pressure on
staff physicians to adhere to DRG guidelines with penalties for those who
prescribe unnecessary treatment or prolonged hospital stays.5" Hospitals
and other health care institutions have also stepped-up risk management
programs in an attempt to identify and reduce potential liability hazards and
thereby minimize necessary expenditures for malpractice liability.5a In addi-
53. Kalb, supra note 8, at 1112-15.
54. Id. at 1112, 1121-24.
55. This Comment does not address the trend among hospitals to close their less
profitable or unprofitable health care services and promote new and more profitable services as
sources of revenue. See James W. Summers, Closing Unprofitable Services: Ethical Issues and
Management Responses, Hostp. & HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., Sept./Oct. 1985, at 8 (discussing
the integration of ethical and management considerations in hospital service closures).
56. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1010 n.22; cf Summers, supra note 55, at 9 (discussing the
closure of unprofitable hospital services because of prospective pricing and the increased pres-
sure to reduce costs).
57. See, e.g., JOSEPH AND ROSE KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, supra note 41, at 3;
Morreim, supra note 1, at 1747; Morreim, supra note 16, at 21.
58. See Allen K. Hutkin; Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Alternatives to Litiga-
tion, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 21, 45-46 (1990) (indicating that risk management programs have
broadened in scope as more hospitals have become partially or totally self-insured). Since
1988, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals has required hospitals to maintain
risk management programs. Id. at 45. Moreover, courts now recognize the responsibility of
hospitals to use care in the selection and monitoring of their employees and medical staff.
Stewart R. Reuter, Vicarious Liability: When Are You a "Second Defendant"?, LEGAL AS-
PECTS MED. PRAC., Nov. 1987, at 6, 7. Commentators have noted that with liability risks
inherent to the UR process, it behooves hospitals to monitor UR programs on their premises.
Marcotte, supra note 17 (citing Los Angeles attorney Michael D. Roth). Such monitoring
would probably be part of the risk management program, although it could be related to a
quality assurance program. See Richard L. Griffith & Jordan M. Parker, With Malice Toward
None: The Metamorphosis of Statutory and Common Law Protections for Physicians and Hospi-
tals in Negligent Credentialing Litigation, 22 TEx. TECH L. REv. 157, 158 n.3 (1991) ("Quality
assurance analyzes patient care problems in the context of what should occur in the hospital.
Risk Management analyzes patient care problems in the context of what should not occur in
the hospital."); see also Bailey, supra note 38, at 11 (addressing risk management programs for
physicians).
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tion, hospitals have sought to offset the burden of increased costs by reduc-
ing their labor costs, especially in the area of nursing, by assigning higher
patient-to-nurse ratios based on the patient classification systems which dic-
tate staffing patterns.59 It has been noted that "[a]lready, a number of hospi-
tal organizations have begun to decrease their nursing complement, asking
those remaining nurses to cover a wider variety of service areas."' More-
over, as the economic pressures of DRGs continue to mount, hospitals in-
creasingly substitute less trained personnel for registered nurses despite
growing concerns about lower quality care.6 ' A decrease is also expected in
the number of allied health care workers as well as a gradual reduction in
the number of staff physicians.62 Standing in opposition to this reduction is
the interesting prediction that the number of management, administrative,
and consultant personnel will increase under the DRG program.63
D. Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems
Responses to the economic crisis in health care have spawned a variety of
alternative delivery systems based on cost containment through utilization
control." Alternative delivery systems include HMOs, Independent Prac-
tice Associations (IPAs), and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).65
Providers-including physicians, nurses, and other medical personnel-are
employed by or contract with these health care entities to provide a full
range of health care services to member patients for prepaid or fixed enroll-
ment fees.66 Alternative delivery systems employ strict protocols and pro-
59. See ERIC D. JOSEPH ET AL., A DRG AND PROSPECTIVE PRICING ACTION PLAN FOR
NURSING 66 (1983) (describing the nature of patient classification systems used to forecast
staffing patterns); JAMES T. ZIEGENFUSS, JR., DRGs AND HOSPITAL IMPACT 156-57 (1985)
("Nursing reductions will be used to hold down and fight the cost pressures that have now
been faced by almost all hospitals. This is not a future possibility, but a strategy already
underway .. ").
60. ZIEGENFUSS, supra note 59, at 156. Ziegenfuss notes the development of a major
problem, however: "As length of stay is shortened, intensity of care will increase, requiring at
least the same, and perhaps greater, nursing support." Id. at 157. (The liability implications
of hospital staff reductions based on financial incentives are outside the scope of this
Comment.)
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id. at 156-57.
63. Id. at 157.
64. See Morreim, supra note 1, at 1721; Hall, supra note 22, at 435-38; Giordani, supra
note 7, at 1012-13.
65. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1012; see also Michael Kanute, Comment, Evolving Theo-
ries of Malpractice Liability for HMOs, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 841-44 (1989).
66. Kanute, supra note 65, at 841. "Alternative health care delivery system" is a phrase
used to describe a provider system that differs from the traditional medical "fee-for-service"
system. Alternative delivery systems utilize fixed prepaid fees for the delivery of all necessary
health care, as opposed to the typical fee-for-service system in which patients pay separate fees
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spective review for non-emergency hospitalizations and medical/surgical
treatments to maximize the efficient use of resources.67 The distinction be-
tween these models is the relationship of the organization to its affiliated
physicians.68
The HMO can be subdivided into two categories: the staff-type and the
group-type.6 9 The staff-type HMO employs individual physicians as staff
members who provide services in HMO-owned facilities.7° In contrast, the
group-type HMO contracts with a physician-group to provide services to
HMO patients, frequently but not always in HMO facilities.71 The second
model of alternative delivery system, the IPA, is actually a third type of
HMO.7 2 Under this model, the HMO contracts with an IPA, which in turn
contracts with individual physicians to provide medical services in individ-
ual office facilities to the affiliated HMO patients.73 HMOs and IPAs en-
courage an economic utilization of health care dollars from the employer's
perspective by providing services for a fixed fee based on enrollment,74 and
from the HMO or IPA perspective by providing financial incentives to staff
and participating physicians to contain costs.75
The third model of alternative delivery system, the PPO, consists of insur-
ers, hospitals, or physician-groups who contract with employers to provide
discounted services to enrolled members.76 The members are encouraged to
utilize the preferred provider network by a system of reimbursement that
pays a higher percentage of the fees charged by listed providers than charged
to independent providers for each service rendered. Id. at 841 n.l. Services typically covered
in an HMO (or alternative delivery system) agreement are those that provide general, emer-
gency, and preventive care-including inpatient and outpatient hospital and physician serv-
ices. Id. at 842 n.5.
67. For a discussion of clinical practice protocols and UR protocols, see infra notes 92-95
and accompanying text. The prospective payment concept of DRGs, HMOs and other alter-
native delivery systems has revolutionized the delivery of health care. Hall, supra note 22, at
437-38. Almost 60% of privately insured Americans participate in some form of prospective
review plan. Id. at 437 n.18.
68. Kanute, supra note 65, at 842.
69. Id. at 842- 43.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 843. The use of physician-owned facilities may come about when a medical
group, already practicing in its own facilities, decides to affiliate with an HMO. Id. at 843
n.15.
72. Id. at 843.
73. Id. at 843-44.
74. See id. at 841-42. Alternative delivery systems seek primarily to attract employers
faced with escalating costs of third party insurance plans who are therefore willing to switch to
an alternative system to decrease the cost of employee health care benefits. See Giordani,
supra note 7, at 1012.
75. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1013-14.
76. Id. at 1013.
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by non-listed providers."" Since employers ultimately absorb all reimbursed
employee health care expenses, whether through the experience-ratings pro-
cess78 of a fully insured plan or through a self-insured plan, they benefit from
the discounted rates if the rates reduce overall costs, depending on the struc-
ture of the PPO option. 79 The incentive for providers to participate is to
maintain their share of patients in an increasingly competitive market.80
III. UTILIZATION REVIEW-MECHANISM FOR COST CONTAINMENT
The primary efforts to hold down health care costs are aimed at control-
ling the use of services. The goal of UR is to control the amount of health
care delivered and ultimately the cost of care by establishing guidelines and
procedures to eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate treatment.8 1 This is
a form of health care rationing 82 that limits reimbursable care to that deter-
mined medically necessary according to protocols.8 3 UR is undertaken by
hospitals, insurance companies, government providers, and HMOs as a
means of cost containment. 84 Moreover, utilization concepts were the basis
for the development of HMO-type provider systemsS-illustrated by the
fact that the HMO structure is based on maximizing the efficient use of
health care dollars by providing substantial incentives to physicians to curb
the use of unnecessary services.8 6
UR is tied to quality control through a balancing process which strives to
control overutilization and simultaneously ensure the delivery of quality
77. See Macaulay, supra note 8, at 99.
78. Under the experience ratings process, the employer receives a credit or dividend for
the amount of premium paid over that paid out for claims and expenses and a debit for any
amount by which claims and expenses exceed the premium. This debit or deficit is reflected in
higher premiums at renewal; even if the policy is not renewed, the employer may be liable for
the deficit by agreement. Id. at 93.
79. For example, a PPO plan might offer an employee the option of care from a listed
provider (who discounts the cost to the PPO) at 100% reimbursement or care from a non-
listed provider (who charges full cost to the PPO) at 80% reimbursement. Id. at 99. Thus,
depending on the discount and reimbursement percentages, an employer may realize a cost
savings from the PPO plan. Contra Giordani, supra note 7, at 1013 n.64 (citing a PPO study
which concluded costs had increased under a PPO option).
80. Macaulay, supra note 8, at 99.
81. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 436.
82. See Marshall B. Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications ofHealth Care Reimbursement
by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 245, 246 (1984).
83. For a discussion of clinical practice protocols and UR protocols, see infra notes 92-95
and accompanying text.
84. See Blum, supra note 29, at 192-94.
85. Saue, supra note 27, at 239 ("Such methods as preadmission certification, concurrent
review, and second surgical opinion programs were initially promoted by... (HMOs) and...
(PPOs) whose financial health depended on successful utilization management.").
86. Morreim, supra note 16, at 21; Giordani, supra note 7, at 1013.
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care."7 UR increases the potential for malpractice liability if efforts to de-
crease utilization and contain costs conflict with the ability to provide ade-
quate health care according to established medical standards."8 Therefore,
from the liability standpoint, UR programs are implicated when care-prov-
iders, in an attempt to stay within coverage guidelines, fail to provide proper
care and negligently cause injury to their patients.8 9 At issue is whether the
provider (hospital or physician) or the third party payer (insurer, govern-
ment, or HMO/alternative delivery system-both provider and payer 9 ) is
liable when the quality of care falls below an adequate standard due to utili-
zation control and cost containment efforts. 91
Two types of protocols are used as a basis for cost effective payment deci-
sions. First, clinical practice protocols, generally set by physicians as a
guideline to patient care management, define a recommended standard of
care specific to a disease or procedure. 92 Second, UR protocols combine
quality control with cost containment strategy to establish guidelines for ap-
propriate care while preventing overutilization.9 3 UR is achieved from
either one of two perspectives: retrospective review, wherein health care
87. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 436.
88. Eg., Marcotte, supra note 17.
89. As a result of the tension between medical economics and quality of care issues, physi-
cians are caught in the middle of a conflict between patients, hospitals, and third party payers.
See Lyde, supra note 30, at 1023 (citing an American Medical Association survey in which
almost one-half of the responding physicians indicated they felt pressured to prematurely re-
lease Medicare patients due to reimbursement concerns).
90. Because of the prepaid characteristic of alternative delivery systems, HMO-type prov-
iders assume the financial risk of providing all necessary agreed-upon care, thus becoming both
provider and payer. See Kanute, supra note 65, at 841 n.3; see also Hall, supra note 22, at 436-
37 (noting the duality of treatment and insurance functions performed by HMOs).
91. The risks of liability for injury to patients, the first tier in the health care delivery
system, extend through the system's fourth tier and include liability risks to: health care prov-
iders such as hospitals and physicians, second tier participants; third party payers such as
employers and insurers, third tier participants; and independent utilization reviewers-service
companies offering UR as part of a managed health care program for employers, insurers, and
alternative delivery systems-fourth tier participants. See Morreim, supra note 16, at 22 (dis-
cussing the role of third party payers and fourth party utilization reviewers in the standardiza-
tion of care). See generally Saue, supra note 27, at 239, 242-43 (discussing "Individual Case
Management," the newest managed care program in which UR is applied to acute care hospi-
talizations to identify the most cost effective care without sacrificing quality); Blum, supra note
29, at 212-28 (discussing case management and its potential liability as a significant emerging
program among cost containment vehicles-designed to coordinate an individual patient's
health care between treating providers and third party payers, with the goal of reducing ex-
penditures for high cost illnesses).
92. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 424. Medicare uses clinical practice protocols to
determine what care should be provided and reimbursed under the DRG system. In addition,
other payers, including insurers such as Blue Cross, are currently using these protocols as a
standard for reimbursement. Id. at 424-25.
93. Id. at 436.
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costs are reimbursed on a reasonable basis criterion after treatment is ren-
dered; and prospective review, wherein health care costs are reimbursed only
for pre-approved treatment.94 The latter form of review, far more effective
as a cost containment measure, is more likely to impact the quality of care
and raise potential liability issues.95
A. DRGs-Prospective Payment System of Cost Containment
Although cost efficiency is the primary objective of the DRG system,
many believe it lowers the quality of health care by promoting rationing. 96
The prospective nature of DRG payments imposes incentives for providers
to undertreat patients, thereby cutting losses where reimbursement fails to
meet the cost of care and increasing profits where reimbursement exceeds
the cost of care.97 This creates the potential for malpractice claims based on
inadequate diagnostic or therapeutic measures or on injury due to premature
discharge.9"
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) were created by
Congress in the early 1970s, primarily as UR organizations, to control run-
94. Lyde, supra note 30, at 1024-25; see also Kinney & Wilder, supra note 14, at 436
("Utilization review protocols are chiefly used in two different contexts: (1) before or during
the course of an admission to determine whether continued stay or a particular treatment is
medically appropriate; and (2) after discharge, to determine for payment purposes whether the
stay or services rendered were medically appropriate."). Note that prospective review, which
involves an advance determination about coverage eligibility, also includes a determination of
eligibility for ongoing treatment. This determination is referred to as "concurrent review."
See Macaulay, supra note 8, at 100.
95. Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663, reprinted at 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812
(Ct. App. 1986), review dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987). In Wickline, the California Court
of Appeal stated, "A mistaken conclusion about medical necessity following retrospective re-
view will result in a wrongful withholding of payment. An erroneous decision in a prospective
review process, on the other hand, in practical consequences, results in the withholding of
necessary care, potentially leading to a patient's permanent disability or death." Id.; see also
Saue, supra note 27, at 241.
96. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1011; see also Harry N. Rosenfield, A Patient's Bill of
Rights, LEGAL ASPECTS MED., Nov. 1988, at 3, 3 ("[C]ost-cutting requirements in Medicare
and in DRGs and the prospective payment system in hospitals have been widely faulted for
causing premature discharge and clinical mismanagement of patients because of financial con-
siderations unrelated to the individual patient's health needs.").
97. See Giordani, supra note 7, at 1011.
98. Id. at 1018-19; see also Natalie Kaplin Shemonsky, Early Discharge from the Hospital
Was Basis of Negligence Action, LEGAL ASPECTS MED., Jan. 1988, at 5. As noted by Shemon-
sky, "Untimely release from the hospital is likely to be a more frequent occurrence as hospitals
confront the financial constraints imposed by reimbursement systems such as DRG's." Id.
(further noting that although the DRG guidelines may be properly considered in making dis-
charge determinations, adherence to them is not likely to provide an adequate defense for
charges of negligent premature discharge).
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away costs of the Medicare program.99 The PSRO program failed to meet
expectations and was replaced in 1982, a year prior to the implementation of
DRGs, by the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Or-
ganization (PRO) Program."°° Since the implementation of DRGs, the fo-
cus of UR has shifted from the control of overutilization to overall
monitoring of cost and quality, including the monitoring of attempts by hos-
pitals to undertreat or prematurely discharge Medicare patients or to assign
improper DRGs.' 0 '
PROs were originally designed to be physician-sponsored organizations
through which the work of private doctors was to be reviewed by their
peers.10 2 However, where physician-sponsored contractors prove ineffective,
various for-profit entities may serve as PROs, including insurance companies
and Medicare fiscal intermediaries." PROs are not limited to performing
Medicare review and have been encouraged by law to conduct review for
other public and private entities." 4 Although PROs have traditionally fo-
cused their review on inpatient care, many have begun to review the care
provided by HMOs and other competitive medical plans involving Medicare
risk-sharing contracts.' 05 Hospitals, insurers, and other health-related enti-
ties rely on internal UR mechanisms (which may be carried out by in-
dependent reviewers or by in-house reviewers) for cost and quality control,
although internal mechanisms, as well as government PROs, have built-in
incentives to limit patient care.' °6
Although individual reviewers of a PRO are granted immunity from civil
liability, they are only granted such immunity when acting with due care., 07
However, as one commentator has noted, "Based on provisions in the PRO
statute,.., it appears that a successful challenge for negligence may be quite
difficult outside of the administrative structure."' 0 8 A successful challenge
would require extremely offensive conduct by the PRO reviewer and would
99. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization
and Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1989).
100. Blum, supra note 29, at 195 (citing the Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982 of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -12 (1982) (current
version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c-1 to -13 (West 1991)).
101. Jost, supra note 99, at 5-6.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id. at 6-7.
106. See Kapp, supra note 82, at 248.
107. Blum, supra note 29, at 196 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(b) (1982) (amended 1990)).
108. Id. at 196.
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probably be handled through the administrative process."° Physicians and
providers who act in reliance on the PRO review or in compliance with the
medical norms outlined by the review are likewise immune from civil suit,
provided they exercise due care in treatment. o" 0 However, until 1990 PROs
were not granted immunity as corporate entities and could conceivably be
sued under several theories of liability, including vicarious liability for the
negligent conduct of employees, corporate negligence for errors in organiza-
tion or administration, or as a third party in a suit against a fiscal intermedi-
ary whose negligent acts were related to the PRO review."'
States generally do not provide for review entities such as the federally
mandated PROs to review services under state Medicaid programs, but in-
stead provide that reviews be conducted under the auspices of various state
agencies." 2 In these circumstances, tort liability for Medicaid reviewers at
the state level may be challenged according to state agency law, under which
the agency may be granted immunity from suit, or may be challenged ac-
cording to PRO procedures if the review was conducted under a PRO con-
tractual agreement.' 13
B. HMOs-Health Care Delivery Based on Utilization Control
HMOs and related alternative delivery systems (hereinafter collectively
referred to as HMOs) were established in response to the need to control
escalating health care costs." 4 Federal legislation'.' and state enabling stat-
utes authorize and regulate their operation." 6 While hospital liability for
negligence is fairly well established, HMO liability is unclear." 7 Some
states' laws shield HMOs against malpractice liability for the actions of any
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (1982)). But see Morreim, supra note 1, at 1752.
Referring to liability of the treating physician, Morreim states, "PRO regulations require that
physicians continue to exercise 'due care.' Without such a requirement, patients would have
virtually no civil protection against medical incompetence or carelessness, since physicians and
review organizations would be free to endorse virtually any standard of care they wished." Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c)(2) (1982)). Morreim believes that adding the due care require-
ment "essentially reinstates the common law standards of liability, because the physician who
adheres to the relevant formalized norm could still be found liable if the patient needed more
elaborate care." Id. at 1752.
111. See Blum, supra note 29, at 196-97.
112. Id. at 197.
113. Id.
114. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1012.
115. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1988).
116. Kanute, supra note 65, at 844-45.
117. Id. at 841. See generally Linda F. Rice, HMOs: Emerging Areas of Liability, 11
WHiTrIER L. REV. 33 (1989) (discussing the relaxation of judicial and legislative doctrine
which previously protected HMOs from malpractice liability).
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individual or entity rendering services to members under the auspices of the
HMO."' Other states have permitted the injured party to sue the HMO, as
well as the physician, under various theories advanced to hold the HMO
liable for the negligence of its affiliated physicians."1 9 These theories include
those traditionally applied to hospitals: respondeat superior, ostensible
agency, corporate negligence, and breach of contract. 12o In addition, HMOs
face increasing liability under the theory of negligent selection or supervision
of a physician or physician-group.'21 However, because HMOs "arguably
118. See, e.g., Harrell v. Total Health Care, 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 354.125 (1978) which grants immunity to health
service corporations for the negligence of those rendering health services to members). But see
Moshe v. Anchor Org. for Health Main., 557 N.E.2d 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied,
561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. 1990) (addressing 1988 amendment to the Illinois Voluntary Health Serv-
ices Plans Act eliminating Statutory immunity of HMOs, codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
para. 620 (1988 Supp)).
119. Cases Indicating HMO May Be Liable for Doc's Malpractice Are Starting to Stack up,
MANAGED CARE L. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1990, at 2, 2 (citing Dan Mulholland, Address at Man-
aged Care Law: New Risks, New Solutions, Group Health Association of America meeting)
[hereinafter HMO Cases]; see also Kanute, supra note 65, at 863-73.
120. Kanute, supra note 65, at 841; HMO Cases, supra note 119, at 2-3; see, e.g., Schleier v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (invoking the doctrines of
ostensible or apparent agency and respondeat superior to hold an HMO liable for breach of
contractual duty to provide adequate medical care when an independent consulting physician
hired by the HMO was negligent); Sloan v. Metro Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that failure to incorporate under the state's Professional Corpo-
ration Act-which did not shield medical corporations from the liability of their physician-
employees-would not protect an HMO from a vicarious liability suit under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for an alleged failure to diagnose); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547
A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (applying the doctrine of ostensible agency to an ar-
rangement in which a patient selected his physician from an HMO provided list, therefore
looking to the HMO as an institution for medical care, rather than the physician); Depenbrok
v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726 (Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing a breach
of warranty cause of action against an HMO when a physician promised a particular result);
Stelmach v. Physicians Multispecialty Group, No. 53906, 1989 Mo. App. LEXIS 852, at *26-
27 (Mo. Ct. App. June 13, 1989) (holding that a physician group did not avoid liability for
breach of a medical services contract to provide quality services when it hired an independent
contracting physician). But see Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 377-79
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an HMO was not liable for malpractice because it did not
practice medicine and its associated physicians were independent contractors; further holding
that the plaintiff-patient could not invoke the doctrine of ostensible agency because that theory
had not been pleaded at trial level); Mitts v. H.I.P. of Greater New York, 478 N.Y.S.2d 910,
911 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that a health insurance plan was not liable for the medical
negligence of its independent contractor physicians); Propst v. Health Maintenance Plan, 582
N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an HMO corporation was not in the
practice of medicine and was not liable for the medical malpractice of its physicians).
12 1. Rice, supra note 117, at 34. More creative approaches include allegations of violations
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, codified at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991), which generally involve fraud and focus on
the promotional aspects of HMO facilities. Id. at 35. These allegations raise issues of whether
HMOs are obligated to disclose information regarding financial ties with their affiliated physi-
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achieve savings by encouraging [the] underuse of services,"' 122 a more inter-
esting and alarming prospect is the potential for liability based on the inher-
ent cost containment structure of the HMO system.'
23
By providing treatment as well as performing the insurance functions in-
volved in the delivery of health care, "HMOs internalize in the provider the
costs of medical care."' 24 Because of this dual structure, the key concept
behind the organization of HMOs is the control of utilization. 125 If utiliza-
tion increases, fixed enrollment fees provide less profit; if utilization de-
creases, fixed enrollment fees provide greater profit. 2 ' The primary HMO
strategy to reduce the number and cost of hospital days-which consume the
largest portion of health care dollars-is to require pre-admission and con-
current review for full reimbursement of non-emergency hospital ex-
penses. 127 These procedures provide a strong basis for structural liability
when patients who receive an adverse prospective payment decision subse-
cians and whether HMOs should be liable for intentional misrepresentation in materials which
suggest that all doctors are qualified and will promptly deliver reasonable and competent care.
Id.
122. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1013.
123. Rice, supra note 117 at 34 ("There is now case law which suggests that where cost
containment features interfere with the quality of the medical care rendered, a patient may
have recourse against the HMO, despite the fact that it has complied with the quality assur-
ance and other regulatory provisions.").
An example of cost containment efforts likely to raise liability issues is the attempt by
HMOs to control the costs of emergency room care. M. Carroll Thomas, Did HMO Cost
Controls Kill This Baby?, MED. ECON., June 8, 1987, at 54. Because HMOs provide care on a
capitated or fixed enrollment fee basis, they tend to have stringent controls on coverage for
care provided outside the HMO, particularly in situations where patients seek routine care in
hospital emergency rooms. Id. If the HMO has a "gatekeeper" physician on call to direct
patient care, that physician, who is under pressure to control costs, has the responsibility to
assess patient status and confirm or deny coverage for services outside the HMO. Id. at 57. A
misdiagnosis may lead to injury and liability when care is denied Medicaid-HMO patients,
who by definition do not have independent funds to obtain medical treatment. See id. at 54-58
(discussing the potential liability related to HMO cost control policies in a tragic situation in
which a five-month-old child died at home within hours of an HMO-physician's alleged refusal
to confirm policy coverage which would have allowed the child to be seen at its affiliated
hospital emergency room).
124. Hall, supra note 22, at 436-37.
125. See Giordani, supra note 7, at 1012-14.
126. Id. at 1013 n.55. HMOs are paid on a capitation basis in which "the enrollee's use of
the services provided has no influence whatever on the fixed sum paid." Id. The author notes
that "if the enrollee requires care costing more than the premium paid covers, the HMO loses
money. Conversely, if the enrollee requires less service than the premiums cover, the HMO
makes a profit." Id. (citing Perkins, The Effects of Health Care Cost Containment on the Poor:
An Overview, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831, 843 (1985); Furrow, Medical Malpractice and
Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W. Rns. 985, 986 (1986)).
127. Macaulay, supra note 8, at 100.
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quently allege that they did not receive proper medical care.'28
The practice of providing financial incentives to member or contracting
physicians to decrease patient use of services is another cost control strategy
that increases the potential for HMO structural liability.' 29 As one com-
mentator has stated, "These incentives are far more powerful than mere in-
cremental income for performing extra services, well-known under fee-for-
service. Now, an HMO physician may see wide fluctuations in his income as
a direct result of his medical decisions."' 3° For example, physicians may
receive large bonuses for reducing hospital stays or performing outpatient
surgery instead of inpatient surgery; on the other hand, they may face a loss
of employment or hospital privileges if uncompensated patient expenses are
too high.' 3 ' Such a system makes it possible for physicians to find them-
selves weighing their own interests against those of their patients.1 32 It has
been suggested, therefore, that these arrangements may violate public policy
by disrupting the patient-doctor relationship. '3' According to one commen-
tator, "If the physician's primary interest is no longer the patient, but is
divided between the patient and the HMO, there is a tension between the
three parties."' 34 If this tension results in patient injury, the likely forum for
the resolution of the conflict is the courtroom.' 35
IV. LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT AND
REVIEW
A. Judicial Theories of Liability
Wickline v. California,'36 a 1986 California case, was the first appellate
decision on the issue of tort liability of a third party payer whose prospective
review decision denying continuation of hospital coverage allegedly inter-
fered with medical judgment and negligently caused harm to the patient. 137
The third party payer was the State of California through its state Medicaid
128. Id.
129. See Saue, supra note 27, at 243. See generally Morreim, supra note 16 (discussing the
implications of cost containment strategies on physicians' decisions regarding patient care).
130. Morreim, supra note 16, at 21.
131. Id.; see also Giordani, supra note 7, at 1013 (discussing examples of financial incen-
tives which may include bonuses paid to physicians from unspent premium dollars that had
been allocated for specialist-consultant or inpatient hospital fees).
132. Morreim, supra note 16, at 21.
133. Rice, supra note 117, at 35.
134. Id. at 35-36.
135. Id. at 36.
136. Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, reprinted at 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App.
1986), review dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987).
137. Macaulay, supra note 8, at 100; accord Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
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program known as "Medi-Cal." At issue was whether Medi-Cal, as a health
care payer, could be brought within the medical malpractice chain of causa-
tion.138 In this landmark case, the California Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, recognized both the public interest in cost containment and the high
stakes in prospective UR, in which an erroneous decision withholding care
may lead to disability or death.139 After balancing broad standards, the
court refused to hold Medi-Cal liable for patient injury under California's
codified negligence liability rules." In dicta, however, the Wickline court
did not foreclose the possibility of third party payer liability when a "defect"
in the cost containment mechanism might be the cause of harm.' 4 '
The facts of the Wickline case are straightforward. Lois Wickline, a
Medi-Cal patient, underwent peripheral vascular surgery for an obstruction
of the terminal aorta, a condition known as Leriche's Syndrome.14 2 She re-
ceived pre-approval authorization from Medi-Cal for the surgery and a ten-
day hospitalization. 143 When post-operative complications required two
more surgeries, Wickline's surgeon requested authorization from Medi-Cal
for an additional eight days of hospitalization which he deemed "medically
necessary."'" The Medi-Cal reviewer only authorized a four-day exten-
sion.' 4 5 Although all three of Wickline's attending physicians knew they
could request a further extension from Medi-Cal by telephone, no such re-
quest was made. 146 Wickline was released on the fourth additional day. 147
Her condition worsened following discharge and, by the time of re-admit-
tance, required amputation of her leg.' 48 Wickline's surgeon testified that, in
138. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
139. Id. at 811-12.
140. Id. at 818. In examining the state negligence liability standard, the Wickline court
reviewed Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). In Rowland, the Supreme Court of
California, citing section 1714 of the California Civil Code, set forth the applicable negligence
liability rule: all persons must use ordinary care to prevent injury to others as a result of their
conduct; and, in the absence of any statutory exception to that fundamental principle, no ex-
ception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
818 (citing Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563-64). In balancing whether a departure from the funda-
mental principle was warranted, the Wickline court considered a number of broad criteria,
including: foreseeability of harm to the patient, certainty of injury, connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury, moral blame for the defendant's conduct, extent of the
defendant's burden, policy of preventing future harm, and community consequences of impos-
ing a duty of care with resultant liability for breach. Id. (citing Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564).
141. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
142. Id. at 812.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 812-13.
145. Id. at 814.
146. Id. at 815.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 816.
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his opinion, the requested eight-day extension would have saved her leg, but
that she was not in critical or deteriorating condition when she was initially
released from the hospital.149 In fact, all medical testimony indicated Wic-
kline's discharge fell within medical standards. 50
In essence, the Wickline court found that the state's review of the request
for an extended hospitalization had been performed according to Medi-Cal's
statutory guidelines which include provisions for prospective review of non-
emergency hospitalizations. 5 ' The court indicated Medi-Cal was not a
party to the actual discharge decision which, even if negligently made, was
ultimately the responsibility of Wickline's physician.' 52
In deciding Wickline, the court recognized the public interest in cost con-
tainment and ultimately found Medi-Cal non-liable as a third party payer. 
153
The opinion nonetheless stirred controversy throughout the health care
community by forecasting potential liability for parties involved in cost con-
trol programs. 1 54 The court warned that if a party who has a duty to pro-
vide patient care fails to provide that care, the injured patient should recover
from all responsible parties, even from third party payers if appropriate.155
The court indicated that payers could be held legally accountable when an
inappropriate medical decision results from "defects in the design or imple-
mentation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals
made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ig-
nored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden."' 56 However, in absolv-
ing Medi-Cal from liability, the court stated that Wickline's physician
should have appealed Medi-Cal's decision to limit the hospitalization if in
his judgment the authorization was not appropriate under the circum-
stances.157 According to the court's decision, "the physician who complies
without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, when
his medical judgment dictates otherwise," is ultimately responsible for the
care of his patient.' The court indicated that a physician "cannot point to
the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his
149. Id. at 815, 817.
150. Id. at 816.
151. Id. at 820 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14132-33 and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, § 51327(a)(2)). Coverage authorization is based on a determination of "medical necessity"
according to community medical practice standards. Id. at 818-20.
152. Id. at 819-20.
153. Id. at 820.
154. Id. at 819; see also, Saue, supra note 27, at 241; Marcotte, supra note 17.
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own determinative medical decisions go sour."139 Because Wickline's physi-
cian had not appealed Medi-Cal's determination, the court ruled that Medi-
Cal had not made a decision to override the medical judgment of the attend-
ing physician; therefore, the state was not liable.'6
The Wickline court concluded with a comment on the effect of cost con-
tainment programs on professional medical judgment: "While we recognize,
realistically, that cost consciousness has become a permanent feature of the
health care system, it is essential that cost limitation programs not be per-
mitted to corrupt medical judgement."'' Thus, while supporting Medi-
Cal's UR decision in Wickline's case, the opinion revealed judicial hostility
to arguments that cost constraints should preclude physician or payer liabil-
ity for erroneous UR decisions' 62-leaving open questions regarding the pa-
rameters under which liability might be found.
Four years later, in Wilson v. Blue Cross,'61 the same court that authored
Wickline addressed the confusion created by that controversial opinion. In
Wilson, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, identified a large
portion of its Wickline decision as dicta and limited application of the Wick-
line holding to its facts, in particular to the context of Medi-Cal patients. 6"
Consequently, the Wilson court set forth a broader basis of liability for UR
in the private sector by finding a patient's private insurance company, its UR
contractor, and the individual reviewing physician all potentially liable for
allegedly causing injury to the patient by negligently refusing to confirm cov-
erage for an extended hospital stay.' 65
The Wilson case was filed on behalf of the estate of a patient who commit-
ted suicide after learning that his private insurer, through its utilization re-
viewer, had denied authorization for continued hospitalization prescribed by
his physician for severe depression.' 66 The company based its denial on a
lack of medical necessity. 167 The patient, unable to pay for additional treat-
ment on his own, had reportedly made progress until he was prematurely
discharged due to the denial of benefits. ' 6' The alleged negligence occurred
159. Id.
160. Id. at 819-20.
161. Id. at 820.
162. Marcotte, supra note 17 (quoting Barry Furrow, Address at the A.B.A. Medical Mal-
practice National Institute, Reno, Nev. (Mar. 1988)).
163. Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 1990 Cal.
LEXIS 4574 (Oct. 11, 1990).
164. Id. at 878.
165. Id. at 882-85.
166. Id. at 877-78.
167. Id. at 882.
168. Id.
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when the California reviewer applied concurrent UR, but was unaware that
the patient's Blue Cross plan was based outside of California and did not
provide for such a review process.1 69 The court held that the plaintiffs had
established a prima facie case for tortious breach of contract. 7"
In deciding Wilson, the court carefully re-examined Wickline and repudi-
ated a large portion of that holding."' The court distinguished three key
elements of the Wickline decision. First, the UR discharge decision in Wick-
line was within the medical standard of care-in essence Medi-Cal's stan-
dard was that of the community.172 Second, the funding process in Wickline
was pursuant to statutory regulations rather than a private insurance con-
tract, thus altering the normal criteria for tort liability.1 73 The Wilson court
identified this rationale, along with the fact that the discharge decision fell
within the standard of care, as the legitimate basis for the Wickline deci-
sion.17' Finally, the Wickline case was not one in which a cost limitation
program, the UR decision, was allowed to corrupt the judgment of a pa-
tient's private physician."'" Finding none of the Wickline criteria applicable
to the Wilson case, the court refused to uphold summary judgment motions
by the defendants.'
7 6
In Wilson, the court identified as dicta the Wickline language which at-
tributes to the physician both the ultimate responsibility for protesting a UR
decision he believes erroneous and the sole liability for the actual dis-
charge. "7 The Wilson court refused to invoke these theories to protect the
insurer, the UR contractor, or the UR physician from potential liability for
two reasons: first, they were premised on dicta; and second, they miscon-
strued the test for joint tort liability.' 71 However, the court adhered to some
controversial portions of Wickline by relating UR decisions to the general
rule of civil tort liability. Under the general rule, an injured person is enti-
tled to recover from all parties who are legally responsible for causing in-
jury." 9 The Wilson court repudiated any public policy defense that favors
169. Id. at 881, 883.
170. Id. at 885.
171. Id. at 878-80. The court stated, "We realize that the trial court's decision ... was
heavily influenced by portions of the Wickline decision which quite frankly contained over-
broad language and constituted dicta. However, it would be inappropriate for this court to
allow errors in one of its own prior decisions to remain uncorrected in this case." Id. at 885.
172. Id. at 879.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 880.
175. Id. at 879.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 880, 884.
178. Id. at 883.
179. Id. at 884. The court indicated that any one of the parties causing injury could be
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the use of concurrent UR as a process which alters the normal rules of tort
liability, especially in the context of a private insurance policy.' 80
Wickline was the first reported examination of the clash between a treat-
ing physician's medical judgment and the requirements of a third party pro-
gram, but not the first to address the potential structural liability of cost
containment programs.' 8 ' In Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,8 2 a
1979 California appeals court rejected allegations of fraud against an HMO
accused of deceiving a member into believing he would receive the highest
quality care and treatment, when in fact, HMO program incentives en-
couraged the treating physicians to conserve care. 18 3 The court noted that
the use of this type of incentive plan to conserve costs was recommended by
professional organizations as well as the federal government; furthermore,
there was no conclusive evidence of treatment outside the accepted standard
of care. 1
8 4
More recently, however, other courts have espoused a stricter view on the
liability of cost containment programs. For example, in Bush v. Dake,'8 5 a
1989 Michigan county circuit court dismissed a structural liability claim
against an HMO based on its statutorily authorized utilization control pro-
cess, but refused to dismiss a claim alleging that the use of the control sys-
tem had denied the patient access to adequate care and was a negligent cause
of injury.'" 6 Refusing to second guess legislative policy, the court empha-
sized that state legislators had approved the existence of HMOs, as well as
their use of provider incentives, risk sharing, and UR as mechanisms for cost
held jointly liable if his negligent conduct was a legal cause of harm, that is, if his conduct was
a substantial factor in causing the injury and there was no law relieving him of liability. Id. at
883 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431).
180. Id. at 884.
181. Saue, supra note 27, at 241-42.
182. Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. ,App. 1979).
183. Id. at 393-94. The Pulvers family sued an HMO for malpractice in wrongfully delay-
ing chemotherapy for Mr. Pulver's leukemia, allegedly shortening his life. Id. at 393, 395.
184. Id. at 393-94.
185. Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 NM-2, slip op. (Cir. Ct. for Saginaw County, Mich. Apr.
27, 1989). In Bush, the plaintiff was insured under an HMO plan through her husband's
employer. Id. at 1. Under that plan, the HMO contracted with a physician-group to provide
primary patient care on a monthly capitation fee basis. Id. at 2. A monetary pool was main-
tained out of which the physicians would receive extra profits if the fund was not expended on
referral fees. Id. When the plaintiff complained of vaginal bleeding, the physicians allegedly
delayed referral and the ultimate diagnosis of cervical cancer. Id. They failed to perform pap
smears which would have revealed the condition at an earlier stage. Id. at 3. Under the HMO
regulations, only the primary physician, who was not entitled to additional pay above the
capitation fee, could perform pap smears. Id. The plaintiff argued that the HMO should be
found structurally liable on public policy grounds for providing disincentives to treat, as well
as negligent and fraudulent for using the system in her case. Id. at 1.
186. Id. at 3-4.
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control.18  However, the court refused to dismiss the issue of whether the
operation of the HMO system in Bush had "in and of itself proximately
contributed to the malpractice,... [or to] ... the improper treatment and
delay in diagnosis of [the plaintiff-patient's] cancerous condition." ''R
B. Cost Control Defense
In response to current economic constraints, some medical-legal commen-
tators have proposed a cost control defense to charges of medical negli-
gence. 8 9 Soon after the implementation of DRGs, one commentator stated
that "in the wake of the DRG system and related developments, . . . the
medical profession will [quite likely] accommodate the profession-dominated
standards of malpractice laws to the economizing values of rationing deci-
sions, by implicitly altering substantive norms of medical conduct.'' 9°
Under the current legal system, the medical profession determines the
standard of care for medical negligence.' 9 ' As long as a physician's actions,
or those of other health care providers, fall within the parameters of accepta-
ble quality, liability will not be imposed. 192 However, if a provider is sued
for medical malpractice, defenses can take one of two forms: an ordinary
defense, wherein a defendant denies the validity of the charge that care devi-
ated from an acceptable standard; or an affirmative defense, wherein-in the
cost control context-a defendant alleges cost considerations as a justifica-
tion for providing care outside the parameters of the current standard of
care.' 93 An explicit affirmative defense based upon cost control objectives
would likely fail today in spite of the economic condition of the health care
environment. 94 It has been stated that because current professional norms
do not openly embrace health care rationing, "the physician who indepen-
dently rations care for particular patients and then expressly cites the neces-
sity to ration as an excuse for treating the patient in a less than preferable
manner is taking a course that is fraught with legal jeopardy."' 95 However,
187. Id. at 3.
188. Id. at 4.
189. E.g., Kapp, supra note 82, at 249-51. See generally Giordani, supra note 7, at 1022-
32.
190. Kapp, supra note 82, at 250.




195. Id. at 250. Some commentators predict that health care in the United States, necessi-
tated by the economic and legal impact of DRGs, will follow the pattern of implicit rationing
that has become part of the British system of socialized medicine. Id. Under the British sys-
tem, the standards of care are more reflective of economic realities and the scarcity of re-
sources. Id. The British have lowered the standards of medical practice to account for age,
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as health care standards evolve toward an accommodation of the economic
values inherent in rationing decisions, the nature of an affirmative cost con-
trol defense would change to an ordinary defense because there would be no
deviation from the accepted standard of care.196
Although cost containment mechanisms have found support in some case
law, the trend in malpractice actions has been to strengthen liability princi-
ples against parties who erroneously base medical decisions on economic cri-
teria. In this vein, the California Court of Appeal, First District, has
indicated that although the California Department of Health Services has a
valid interest in guarding public funds against unnecessary medical expendi-
tures, "cost-consciousness must not take precedent over the legitimate medi-
cal needs of ... [a Medicaid] recipient for continued services." 197
On the other hand, the financial condition of the health care system de-
mands that due consideration be given to reasonable and legitimate cost con-
trol efforts when assigning liability. Proponents continue to argue
persuasively for a cost-based defense, stating that in order "[t]o facilitate the
health status, and potential productivity in health care programs; this redefinition of norms
imposes severe restrictions on access to the more advanced technologies. Id.
Evidence indicates that forms of rationing already exist in the United States, despite moral
or legal reluctance to the concept. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 18 (discussing two forms of
rationing, including the overt denial of care and the less visible form of silent rationing which
involves trade-offs of quality for cost, for example, through slowdowns in research and devel-
opment or denials of care as "experimental"); Victor Cohn, Rationing Medical Care: It's Here
and This Is Just the Beginning, WASH. POST, July 31, 1990, Health Magazine, at 10, 10-11
(describing silent rationing as a mechanism by which the indigent are subjected to a decrease in
covered services and supplies and long delays in treatment); see also supra note 23 (discussing
forms of health care rationing).
The Oregon state legislature recently enacted an aggressive rationing program which seeks,
through a ranked list of medical priorities, to provide a higher level of basic care to a greater
number of Medicaid recipients at the cost of eliminating more advanced and expensive treat-
ments that are ranked lower in priority. Cohn, supra, at 10-13; Flanigan, supra note 2; Not
Enough for All: Oregon Experiments with Rationing Health Care, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1990,
at 53, 55. Implementation of the Oregon plan awaits federal approval. Alan K. Ota &
Roberta Ulrich, Economy Ranks As Foremost Issue That Congress Faces, OREGONIAN, Janu-
ary 19, 1992, at CIO. Meanwhile, in spite of criticism that the program favors the rich by
creating a two-tier health care system, several other states have expressed interest in the plan
and a few have drafted similar legislation. Oregon: A Trade-Offon Health Costs, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 8, 1991, at 6.
196. Kapp, supra note 82, at 250.
197. Frank v. Kizer, 261 Cal. Rptr. 882, 887 (Ct. App. 1989). In Frank, the court man-
dated that Medi-Cal adhere to the federally regulated notice guidelines to terminate or suspend
benefits. In addressing Medi-Cal's cost control arguments against full compliance, the court
cited Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663, reprinted at 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Ct.
App. 1986), review dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987), stating that "[a]lthough the reviewing
court exonerated the Department .... [Wickline] presents a graphic example of harm to the
recipient when the fiscal 'bottom-line' takes precedence over the medical needs of the recipi-
ent." Id.
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adoption of more cost-effective norms of medical practice, the courts, in de-
fining the standard of due care, must recognize cost as a valid defense against
malpractice actions .... 98
V. CONCLUSION
The economic nature of the health care system has created tension be-
tween providers who seek to deliver the highest quality care, avoid liability,
and enhance their financial profits, and purchaser-payers of health care who
seek the provision of quality care with a controlled escalation of costs. The-
oretically, the system demands an ongoing balance in the use of health care
services. If overutilization occurs, providers either do not get reimbursed or,
if they do, overall medical costs rise unnecessarily. If underutilization oc-
curs, individuals may be deprived of needed services and the responsible
health care providers, primarily physicians and hospitals, are potentially lia-
ble for malpractice. Attaining a balance in health care utilization presents a
formidable goal. Medical decision-making, historically dependent on scien-
tific and human variables, is now influenced by economic variables as well.
In the past, health care reimbursements flowed freely. Many providers over-
prescribed treatments to ensure their patients every advantage, decrease the
likelihood of malpractice suits, and simply because the funds were available.
However, because of the financial crisis in the health care system, various
cost containment programs, including UR, now place pressure on providers
to make more conservative decisions which may be implicated as a cause of
patient injury.
Although the courts have limited experience with UR and related pro-
spective payment systems, cases to date may predict future liability parame-
ters as prospective UR becomes more entrenched and more of these cases are
litigated. The Wilson and Bush decisions exemplify the courts' willingness to
hold HMOs, third party payers, and utilization reviewers potentially liable if
harm is negligently inflicted as a result of cost containment measures or UR
procedures. Although some jurisdictions may grant immunity based on stat-
utory or public policy considerations in support of cost control efforts, there
are indications that such parties may be held liable under general tort princi-
ples for the negligent infliction of injury or under contract principles for bad
faith breach of a medical care contract.
198. Giordani, supra note 7, at 1029 (quoting P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE-
ORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 143 (1985)); see also Morreim, supra note 1, at 1757-58
(proposing a rebuttable presumption in which it is presumed that all patients are owed the
same basic quality of care regardless of economic circumstances, but in which a physician can
rebut the presumption by describing how the diminution of care arose of necessity and not of
negligence).
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Cost containment mechanisms are based on objective criteria, whereas in-
dividual claims are based on subjective criteria-this dichotomy creates con-
flicts regarding limitation setting. The attending physician is in the best
position to evaluate whether utilization constraints are appropriate in a
given case. Liability is appropriately assessed against third party payers (in-
cluding HMOs as payers) and fourth party utilization reviewers when injury
results from a denial of care because the attending physician has no reason-
able access to appeal a decision denying coverage or when injury results
from arbitrary or capricious denials of coverage. Likewise, providers are
justifiably liable when injury results from inappropriate attention to eco-
nomic criteria in the making of health care decisions. This does not mean,
however, that legitimate cost control programs, including UR, should not
receive reasonable protection from liability.
The statistical data on health care costs and the failure of attempts to
control their rapid escalation attest to the economic crisis faced by providers,
payers, and recipients of health care services. The vast majority of cost con-
tainment programs today-including DRG programs; alternative delivery
systems; and hospital, employer, and insurer programs-are based on the
economic realization that it is not feasible to provide every conceivable treat-
ment for every patient at any cost. Public interest in the control of health
care costs dictates that reasonable financial considerations be factored into
the standards of care that physicians and other providers are expected to
deliver and against which liability is measured for all participants in the de-
livery of health care. The difficulty with this approach is that while provid-
ers maintain a fairly close nexus to the patient, third party payers and fourth
party reviewers are one and two steps removed. For that reason, it may be
appropriate to more closely scrutinize their actions. However, third and
fourth party liability for utilization decisions should be limited to situations
in which their decisions fall outside reasonable parameters that include eco-
nomic considerations.
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